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iAbstract: A recent literature has used variation just around deterministic legislative pop-
ulation thresholds to identify the causal eﬀects of institutional changes. This paper reviews
the use of regression discontinuity designs using such population thresholds. Our concern
involves three arguments: (1) simultaneous exogenous (co-)treatment, (2) simultaneous
endogenous choices and (3) manipulation and precise control over population measures.
Revisiting the study by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), who analyse the relationship
between council size and government spending, we present new evidence that these three
concerns do matter for causal analysis. Our results suggest that empirical designs using
population thresholds are only to be used with utmost care and conﬁdence in the precise
institutional setting.
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ii1 Introduction
Scholars in political economy devote much attention to the causal identiﬁcation of the
eﬀects of fundamental rules and features of governmental organization (e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (2002)). Estimating the causal eﬀects of institutional designs and constitutional
rules, however, is generally a diﬃcult task for a number of reasons (see Acemoglu (2005)).
The main challenges are that institutional rules are usually endogenous and seldom change,
that diﬀerent aspects of constitutional designs often correlate and change simultaneously
and that data analysis is often limited by small samples. The new interest has therefore
turned to subnational levels and statistical methods from the program evaluation literature
in the attempt to use quasi-random variation in speciﬁc rules to estimate their impact.
One speciﬁc class of designs being used in a range of diﬀerent applications are regres-
sion discontinuity designs that focus on population thresholds. Pettersson-Lidbom (2006)
and Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) investigate whether the municipality’s council size,
which changes at deterministic population thresholds, aﬀects local government spending.1
Regression discontinuity designs, based on population thresholds, are also used to study
performance of politicians when salaries increase (Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009) and
Ferraz and Finan (2009)), the eﬀect of ﬁscal transfers on local elections (Litschig and
Morrison (2010)), corruption and the quality of politicians (Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and
Tabellini (2009)), as well as the impact of representative democracy versus direct democracy
on government spending (Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2010)).
In this paper, we devote attention to the speciﬁc challenges of using population thresh-
olds for reliable causal inference. Our concern is threefold: (1) The ﬁrst challenge is that
the population threshold used may not only deﬁne the treatment considered but also ad-
ditional simultaneous exogenous co-treatments. (2) The identiﬁcation and interpretation
of the treatment eﬀect is further complicated as additional endogenous choices on other
institutions are often taken simultaneously. The timing of events is likely to coincide as it
is often at speciﬁc times that changes are implemented (e.g. at the beginning of an election
period). (3) Given that the oﬃcial population count is usually observable at any moment,
the speciﬁc concern is that the precise number can be manipulated. In the empirical anal-
ysis, we revisit the study by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) and present new evidence
on the importance of these concerns.
1Both studies use rules (given by the federal or state law) that set the number of members of legislature
based on population count of the locality. Those contributions are perceived to be of great importance
as they focus on causal identiﬁcation. For further studies on this topic compare e.g. Baqir (2002) for
cities and counties in the US, Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001) for state and local governments in the US,
Schaltegger and Feld (2009) for Swiss cantons.
1Researchers using quasi-experimental designs recognize the importance of ensuring that
a particular treatment eﬀect stands in isolation to other confounding simultaneous treat-
ments. In applications using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence designs it is common practice to make
an explicit argument that the treatment group is not simultaneously aﬀected by additional
treatments. Similarly, for the use of instrumental variables, special care is taken in arguing
that the instrument is only of importance to the speciﬁc treatment under investigation (see
Acemoglu (2005)).2 We argue that this problem is critical when using regression discon-
tinuity designs with population thresholds. Population count is an intuitive and easy way
for higher level governments to impose diﬀerential rules on lower tier structures. Hence, it
is very likely that the same thresholds might be used in diﬀerent dimensions of rules and
institutions.
According to Bavarian state law the number of town council members must increase at 10
diﬀerent population thresholds. However, researching the details of Bavarian laws and by-
laws we ﬁnd that the same thresholds also determine large changes in both local institutions
(e.g. referendum quotas, politicians wages) and communal ﬁnances (e.g. additional funds
from the state government). In total, we ﬁnd 14 additional legislative laws or bylaws that
induce diﬀerential rules by population size at the same thresholds. Applying these rules,
we show that a part of the spending eﬀect at population thresholds is ﬁnanced by increases
in state grants and additional revenue from fees.
The second challenge in using population thresholds for identiﬁcation is the timing of
changes in the treatment and changes of other endogenous choices. Local institutions
are often changed simultaneously at the beginning of new electoral cycles. In Bavaria, e.g.,
apart from the change in council size set by the exogenous rule, communities must make
various (endogenous) decisions just before the next election cycle starts. Those decisions
involve, for example, the nature of the mayor position (full-time or part-time) as well as
what new tasks the community wants to be responsible for. For the identiﬁcation of a
speciﬁc treatment eﬀect, this problem becomes twofold: First, because timing coincides
it is harder for the researchers to disentangle the eﬀect in question and, in small sam-
ples, pure statistical variation is more likely to introduce bias in the estimation. Second,
the interpretation of the eﬀect might crucially hinge on the timing and interdependency
of the treatment changes and the choice making. We supplement the data of Egger and
Koethenbuerger (2010) with information on one such endogenous decision (work status of
the mayor) and no longer ﬁnd a signiﬁcant spending eﬀect at the council size thresholds.
2Acemoglu (2005) discusses the fundamental problem for the standard instrumental variable approach:
that the instrument used for e.g. an institutional setting may not only be an instrument for the
institution under investigation but also for a diﬀerent institution. In this case it is not clear what eﬀect
is estimated.
2Our ﬁnal concern is that the population count may be precisely manipulated. As popula-
tion thresholds are critical for the remuneration of government personnel, for allocation of
ﬁnances from other government levels, as well as for the council size, there are large incen-
tives for sorting around the respective population thresholds. The concern of sorting on
the precise threshold is well-recognized in the literature on regression discontinuity design
(RDD) (see Lee and Lemieux (2009), McCrary (2008)). For population thresholds this is
of particular concern as in Germany the number of inhabitants is by no means a surprise,
but rather a regularly updated publicly known number. Hence, whenever a community
comes close to a threshold the administration can purposefully manipulate the number and
precisely sort on the desired population count. For Bavarian municipalities during the pe-
riod of observation we ﬁnd evidence that there is sorting around the population thresholds.
Thus, the spending eﬀects found by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) could be potentially
biased by selection eﬀects.
Given the results of our empirical analysis, we conclude that researchers must be cautious
when using population thresholds for identiﬁcation in regression discontinuity designs. To
be covered against the threats of simultaneous exogenous co-treatment and simultaneous
endogenous decisions, researches must acquire deep institutional knowledge while checking
legal norms and customs thoroughly. Furthermore, testing of the key identifying assump-
tions of RDD is required.3
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical model and the underlying
identiﬁcation assumptions. Section 3 presents the institutional setting and the speciﬁc
use of population thresholds in Bavarian law, before Section 4 highlights our results and
draws comparisons to the ﬁndings reported by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010). Section
5 concludes the analysis.
2 Empirical model and methodology
In this section, we consider the empirical methodology that is involved in the use of deter-
ministic population thresholds in regression discontinuity designs (RDD). After discussing
the basic empirical setup, we clarify the general and the speciﬁc identifying assumptions
needed to allow for causal inference of the treatment eﬀect in question.
3Caughey and Sekhon (2010) revisit the empirical evidence presented in Lee (2008), who uses a RDD
on close election outcomes. The former rigorously investigate the RDD assumptions and ﬁnd that,
for the US House of Representatives, observations in close elections still exhibit crucially unbalanced
predetermined variables that are likely to invalidate the research design.
32.1 Basic model
Assume, for simplicity, that we consider a case in which a treatment is determined at a
single population threshold. Deﬁne vi;t as the distance of the number of inhabitants in
location i at time t from the threshold. Assume further that the treatment (e.g. number
of council members) is discontinuously determined at the threshold (sharp discontinuity
design). The relationship between treatment d1i;t and vi;t is as follows:
d1i;t = 1[vi;t > 0] (1)
The estimation equation specifying the RDD then reads as follows:
yi;t = 0 + 1d1i;t + h(vi;t;) + i;t (2)
where yi;t is the outcome in question (e.g. local government spending), 1 is the parameter
of interest and h() is a ﬂexible function that represents the underlying general relationship
between the distance to the threshold (hence population size) and the outcome variable.
This simple framework can also be easily adjusted to accommodate the fact that treatment
is changing at multiple thresholds (see Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)).
The (see Lee and Lemieux (2009)):
2.2 Identifying assumptions
The parameter 1 is an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect under the critical assump-
tion of continuity(see Lee and Lemieux (2009)). It is only if all observable and unobservable
covariates, except treatment, are distributed continuously around the threshold that one
can assume to have valid counterfactual observations on either side. If observations just
right from the required population count are systematically diﬀerent from the ones just to
the left, then identiﬁcation fails.
The ﬁrst implication of the continuity assumption is that we must ensure that there exist
no further co-treatments. It is obvious that causal inference of an individual eﬀect cannot
be upheld when other treatments are simultaneously determined at the same threshold.
Formally, the existence of co-treatment implies the following. Let a second treatment, d2i;t,
be determined at the same threshold v0:
d2i;t = 1[vi;t > 0] (3)
The individual eﬀects of d1i;t and d2i;t cannot be identiﬁed. The second treatment is omitted
in eq. (2) and the ﬂexible function in v cannot control for it as the threshold coincides.
4Even if the second treatment is observable, one cannot include it in the regression due
to multi-collinearity. The researcher can only identify a joint eﬀect. If one has several
thresholds and diﬀerences in when certain treatments apply, one may hope to disentangle
the isolated treatments. However, the major concern is when and if we fail to recognize
the existence of additional (co-)treatments. Although an outcome was in fact induced by
several changing factors, we instead falsely attribute the eﬀect to only one treatment.
It is important to note that co-treatment is of particular concern because standard RDD
tests are not very likely to detect it. If a second treatment is implemented at the same
threshold, distribution tests of predetermined covariates cannot be expected to detect such
diﬀerences. Further, there is no reason to believe that a direct test of the distribution of
the score variable (McCrary (2008)) will be of help.
For population thresholds the problem of co-treatments has to be critically reviewed on a
case by case basis. Population thresholds are tools for legislatures to induce diﬀerences in
laws and bylaws by the population size of local entities. Thus, the same thresholds are
likely used in several legislative rules.
Apart from exogenous co-treatments, we consider the precise sorting around thresholds to
be of particular concern when using population count in RDD. Lee (2008) shows that it is
suﬃcient to show that there is a random component in the scoring variable to uphold the
continuity assumption. If agents cannot precisely control the variable that determines the
treatment, then in some neighborhood of the threshold, assignment of treatment is eﬀec-
tively random. This random assignment close to the threshold directly implies continuity.
Thus, any RDD application relying on this argument must investigate whether agents can
precisely sort around the threshold. For population count this issue is indeed crucial. The
oﬃcial population of a municipality in Germany is known at any given time. Day to
day changes in the population number are very small and even well ahead of the deﬁning
deadline, the precise population number can be well anticipated by the authorities of the
municipality.4
If the agent can indeed ensure that she ends up just to the right of a certain threshold then
the continuity assumption is likely to fail. Instead of valid counterfactuals, observations
on either side are likely to diﬀer. Variables that drive the selection will be systematically
diﬀerent on both sides and confound the treatment eﬀect estimate.
4Caughey and Sekhon (2010) make the point that it is important to assess the magnitude of the random
component in the score variable as compared to the precision with which agents can actively manipulate
this variable.
5One advantage of the RDD is that the sorting argument can be tested in a number of dif-
ferent ways. McCrary (2008) suggests a direct test of the distribution of the score variable.
If it is proﬁtable for agents to sort on a threshold and the possibility of doing so exists, then
one should observe a higher frequency of observations on one side rather than on the other.
Also, we can look at the distribution of predetermined variables which - given suﬃcient
randomness - should not systematically diﬀer around the thresholds.
Our last concern is a particularity of the use of population thresholds. Typically, a legal rule
that applies a population threshold deﬁnes a deﬁnite point in time when the population
count is taken. This point in time is often distinct from the actual implementation of
the new rule. For example, for Bavarian municipalities council size is determined by a
population count about a year before the council election.oﬃce.5 This year, however, is
also the time during which important institutional decisions are made. The municipal
council, for example, decides whether the next mayor will be part- or full-time and / or
whether the local authorities will be responsible for speciﬁc services.
These endogenous decisions can be problematic in two diﬀerent ways. First, interpretation
of the eﬀect can be complex. Say, a municipality knows that it will increase the council size
in one year. It must decide whether the future council will become responsible for certain
tasks (e.g. water management). Their decision to do so might depend on the anticipated
council size. A larger council might, for example, be able to support additional committees
that can oversee these responsibilities. Those kinds of eﬀects, however, are not included
in the deﬁnition of the treatment eﬀect, as treatment, per se, has not yet started. The
researcher might be willing to redeﬁne treatment, however, speciﬁc care has to be given to
exactly what the object of interest is.
Apart from problems in interpretation, these endogenous decisions might also pose a threat
to the validity of the identiﬁcation, particularly in small samples. Assume that the si-
multaneous endogenous decision is in fact independent from the treatment. As with any
postdetermined variable the researcher can only hope to not pick a strangely unbalanced
sample in which the observations just right and just left are diﬀerent by random selection.
However, as opposed to other variables the timing of those endogenous institutional choices
coincides exactly with the determination of treatment. This makes it much more likely that
an unfavorable sample is picked. In Bavaria, for example, there is a trend to have more
full-time mayors and to locate additional responsibilities at the local level. Naturally, these
5In preparation for a new election, the new council size must be known well ahead of time as certain
preparations directly depend on it. For example, each party will name a number of candidates that is
(typically) exactly as many as there are council seats.
6decisions are made at exactly the same time as council size increases: just before the new
election cycle.
3 Institutional setting
The German federal system comprises of four tiers. Apart from the federal, state and county
level, some key decisions are taken by local municipalities. This local authority decides,
among other issues, on local roads, theaters, cultural events, local business development,
as well as school buildings and administers social welfare programs, kindergarten spending,
etc. Furthermore, they often own and control key parts of the local economy such as waste
disposal, public transport, as well as the energy and water supply. As the municipalities
are the lowest tier of the federal system, most laws regulating their decision mechanisms,
freedoms, and duties are exogenous to them: in Bavaria alone there are hundreds of state
laws and by-laws that refer to municipalities.6 As the state laws apply to all communi-
ties, the state legislature often uses population thresholds to adjust the rules to diﬀerent
requirements of smaller and larger communities.
We worked through the most relevant parts of the applicable state legislation to detect
rules that use population thresholds. We found 14 (excluding the changes in council size)
rules that cover nine of the ten thresholds determining the council size (see table 1 for an
overview of the thresholds relevant to the council size and corresponding further rules).7
We found rules that deﬁne both local institutions and aﬀect budget size. With regards to
budgeting, we found ﬁve rules (see table 6 in the appendix for a detailed description).8 For
example, communities with more than 5,000 inhabitants receive 7.6 percent of the vehicle
tax collected in their territory, while smaller communities do not receive anything - at the
same threshold the council increases from 16 to 20 members. Another rule states that a
city with more than 50,000 inhabitants may apply to become a county free city. If choosing
to do so, the city takes over all the duties previously provided by the county and receives
additional transfers accordingly. We conclude that larger cities receive more transfers and
6All laws and by-laws are available online at a website provided by the government of Bavaria:
http://www.gesetze-bayern.de/jportal/portal/page/bsbayprod.psml (retrieved in March 2011)
7Given the amount of laws and bylaws that regulate municipal decision making, it is still possible that
there are further undetected thresholds.
8Following the state development program (Landesentwicklungsprogramm Bayern, December 22, 2009
version) communities may also be grouped into one of ﬁve levels that indicate regional relevance for
public services. While there are population thresholds among the criteria, these thresholds do not
refer to the community itself but rather to the total population of the respective community plus the
population of the communities it serves.
7Table 1: Changes at council size population thresholds
Population thresholds at # of inhabitants (in tsd)
1 2 3 5 10 20 30 50 100 200
Panel 1: Thresholds used in Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)
Council size x x x x x x x x x x
Wage of elected civil servants x x x x
Panel 2: Further thresholds deﬁning local institutions
Wage of full-time mayors x x x x x x x
Wage of part-time mayors x x x
Full-time council members x
Petition for referendum x x x x x
Referendum quota x x
City districts x
Open council x x
Accounting committee x
Mayor status x x
Panel 3: Further thresholds deﬁning budgeting rules
County free city x
Status of larger city x
Vehicle Tax x
Fiscal equalization x x x x
Notes: We have included only those rules and thresholds that correspond to the thresholds relevant for the council size. For a more
detailed description the changes at each of those population thresholds see tables 6 and 7. Source: Own research.
provide more services than smaller cities and that the thresholds typically coincide with
the community council size thresholds.
Regarding local institutions, there are even more rules that depend on population thresholds
(we found nine, see table 7 in the appendix for details). These prescriptions range from
relatively minor directives (e.g. that the council in cities with more that 5,000 inhabitants
must include an accounting committee) to setting key rules of the local game. The latter
include stipulations for the remuneration of the mayor9 and a detailed regulation concerning
local referendums. The requirements to bring a proposed referendum to the ballot are
9This is likely of signiﬁcant importance for their performance and may hence aﬀect government spending.
Compare e.g. Besley (2004), Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009), Messner and Polborn (2004), Ferraz
and Finan (2009)
8much higher in small communities (where 10 percent have to sign the petition) than in very
large cities (where only three percent need to sign) with multiple steps in the signature
requirement in between. The same general logic applies to the participation quota in the
referendum itself too.10
We conclude that while the number of seats in the council is an important feature of local
institutions, there are several other important local institutions that also change at the
same population thresholds. This leads to double or multiple simultaneous treatment at
any given threshold. The same applies when population thresholds also change the ﬁnancial
endowment of the community (see paragraph above).
Apart from setting population thresholds with budgetary and institutional relevance, the
state laws also provide the communities with many choices in those dimensions. For ex-
ample, the communities may decide to take over tasks from the county, which brings along
new responsibilities, funds and administrative work. Tasks that communities may take over
from higher government levels include: maintaining certain types of roads (compare Finan-
zausgleichsgesetz, Article 13a, version of 2010/06/03), construction supervision (compare
Article 53, Bayerische Bauordnung, version of 2010/02/25), and waste disposal (compare
Articles 5, 7 Bayerisches Abfallwirtschaftsgesetz, version of 2010/03/24). While some of the
tasks that communities acquire from higher levels of government only induce small changes
in revenue (e.g. construction supervision), others trigger large increases in revenues and
spending (e.g. waste disposal).
Moreover, the municipality must regularly make decisions about institutional questions such
as: Should we have a full-time mayor?, How many full-time working council members do
we want? As mayors are elected at the same time that the council is elected and because
additional responsibilities are also more likely to be taken over at the beginning of the
electoral cycle it is probable that such decisions also coincide with increases in council size.
The econometric implications of the resulting possible simultaneous endogenous decision
making are discussed in section 2.
4 Results
Our empirical analysis generally builds on the strategy and data presented by Eggers and
Koethenbuerger (2010).11 Similar to their work, we use data on 2,056 municipalities from
the German state of Bavaria over the 1983 to 2004 period. To investigate our speciﬁc
10e.g. Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley (1992) and Holcombe and Kenny (2008) show that referendum
requirements aﬀect spending.
11We obtained the data and Stata-doﬁles from the authors through the journal website.
9points of interest, we complement their data base with information on the revenue side of
the municipality budget and the status of the town mayor (part-time or full-time).12 The
result section is split into three parts: (1) the importance of simultaneously determined
ﬁnances, (2) the need to control for endogenous (but simultaneous) decisions of the mu-
nicipality, and (3) the potential manipulation by local authorities of population numbers
around thresholds.
4.1 Importance of simultaneous exogenous co-treatment
In the above section, we illustrate that legislative population thresholds in Bavaria not
only aﬀect council size but also a number of other important institutional features. Among
those features are legislative rules that aﬀect the budgeting of communities. Naturally,
those direct ﬁscal consequences for the community are crucial in the identiﬁcation of the
eﬀect of legislative size and governmental spending.
To understand the structure of municipality budgets in more detail, we illustrate some of
the basic ﬁgures in table 8 (see appendix). The average municipality budget in Bavaria
(for all 2056 municipalities in the period 1983-2004) reaches 1909 Euro per capita in total
expenditures.13 On the expenditure side, we highlight the shares of three major budget
components that are (partly) in the discretion of the municipality: expenditures on person-
nel, on materials, as well as investments.14
Below, we present important categories from the revenue side. Under the full discretion
of the local authority are three tax rates15: (1) property tax A on agricultural land, (2)
property tax B on all non-agricultural property and (3) a trade tax on local businesses. In
column (2) we highlight the share that each category has in the overall budget. We ﬁnd
that local taxes account for 20.6 percent of the total revenue with the major part of that
income generated by the trade tax. Local property taxes contribute only about 4.4 percent
to local ﬁnances.
Equally important are grants from other tiers of government and fees for communal services.
We document that about 12.7 percent of revenues come from grants and 9.4 percent are
12This additional data is publicly available and can be obtained free of charge from the Bavarian statistical
service.
13The same ﬁgure has to appear on the revenue side, as all expenditures have to be reﬁnanced either by
tax income, grants or increases in new debt.
14Other important expenditures that are not included are expenditures for debt repayments and expendi-
tures for mandated social services. These are usually not directly in the control of the municipality.
15Only the tax rates are at the discretion of the municipalities - the rules deﬁning the tax base are set by
higher government levels.
10raised through fees on local services.16 It is important to note that the communities have
only very limited decision power when it comes to inﬂuencing grants. Of course, they can
lobby to receive grants and they have some discretion in setting fees, however, for the most
part grants underlie legislative rules and many fees are regulated by the state.17
Table 2: Replication of the results by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)
Outcomes (15 percent window)
Log Total Log Debt Log Prop Log Prop Log Trade
Expenditures Tax Rate A Tax Rate B Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment 0.109** 0.137* 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.009**
(0.052) (0.074) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004)
N 22631 22162 22631 22631 22631
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. We use the program provided by
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) to replicate their main results (see their table 3 and 6). Standard
errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent variable are indicated above. Treatment is deﬁned
by being right to the population thresholds. All regressions include a third order polynomial in
population that is ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. The estimation is done within the 15
percent window of population around the thresholds. Source: Own calculations based on the
program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).
Table 2 replicates the results reported by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).18 Egger and
Koethenbuerger estimate a version of eq. 2 for the thresholds at which population size
changes and document the eﬀect on total expenditures to be an immense 10.9 percent
increase (see column 1, table 2) or 4.2 percent for every additional seat.19 Given the
average total expenditure (per capita) of 1909 Euro, the eﬀect is hence argued to increase
expenditures by the order of about 200 Euro (per capita and year). The size of this eﬀect is
to be evaluated even larger considering that only part of the local expenditures is eﬀectively
under local control.
Looking at the revenue side of the eﬀect, Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) report the
estimates on debt, both types of property tax and the local trade tax (see columns 2-5 in
table 2). They ﬁnd sizable and signiﬁcant eﬀects primarily for the two property tax rates A
and B of 5.5 percent and 5.8 percent increases respectively. They argue that municipalities
16Those fees are levied on services such as water supply, sewage and waste management, kindergartens,
etc.
17The remaining part of the revenue comes from higher levels authorities and are raised, in part, through
income tax and VAT. The community gets a ﬁxed share of these revenues and has no control over the
tax rate. Moreover, revenues can also be generated through new debt.
18We use the same doﬁles and data and get the exact some results from their table 3 and table 6.
19The average increase in the number of seats at the thresholds is 2.56.
11mainly rely on those sources of revenue to ﬁnance the additional expenditures (see Egger
and Koethenbuerger (2010, p. 211)). However, given that the property taxes only account
for 4.4 percent of total revenue, an increase by about 5.8 percent in the those taxes is likely
to increase revenue by only 5 Euro (per capita and year).20
Table 3: The results of council size on state
grants and municipality fees
Outcome (15 percent window)
Log General Log Invest Log Muni
Grants Grants Fees
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.089* 0.273*** 0.236***
(0.047) (0.085) (0.070)
N 21513 21383 21511
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
We use the program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010) to estimate the regressions using their setup, however,
with the outcome variables that we have added to the data.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent vari-
able are indicated above. Treatment is deﬁned by being right
to the population thresholds. All regressions include a third or-
der polynomial in population that is ﬂexible on both sides of
the threshold. Source: Own calculations partly based on the
program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).
Given the exploration on the institutional changes at population thresholds, we suspect
that the additional spending is largely driven by automated changes in the rules that aﬀect
grants as well as the services communities provide (and hence fees collected). In table 3
we apply the design to estimate the increase in grants and fees at the thresholds. We show
that there are substantial, signiﬁcant increases both in grants (27.3 percent in additional
investment grants) and communal fees (23.6 percent additional revenue). In total, the
increases in grants and fees account for about 81 Euro per capita. Hence, we can explain a
substantial part of the expenditure increase (although not the entire eﬀect) by automated
changes in revenues provided by higher levels of government to larger communities.
We document that the identiﬁcation of the council size eﬀect may suﬀer from co-treatment
eﬀects that are simultaneously determined by the same population thresholds. Without
20The eﬀect that they report on the local trade tax is very small with less than 1 percent increase, which
implies that this source of revenue does not play an important part in ﬁnancing the expenditure increase.
The point estimate on the debt is in fact quite large and could explain a substantial part of the
expenditure increase. However, it is insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
12the detailed institutional knowledge and more speciﬁc data on all aspects of the revenue
sources21 it is impossible to distinguish between the “true” eﬀect of legislative size and other
changes at the same thresholds.
4.2 Simultaneous endogenous decision making
Causal analysis is further complicated by the fact that municipalities must make impor-
tant decisions on the structure of the local institutions and the services provided by the
community. It is in the nature of political cycles that the timing of those endogenous
choices coincides with adjustments in council size. As explained above those decisions can
have substantial consequences for municipal ﬁscal situations. We investigate one important
feature of local institutions, namely whether the mayor is working part-time or full-time.
In ﬁgure 2 in the appendix we highlight the share of full-time mayors over the population
distribution. The vertical lines indicate the population thresholds used in the council size
analysis. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the share of full-time majors can be observed around the
2000 and 3000 inhabitants thresholds.22 To further investigate the diﬀerences, we present
the distribution of full-time majors just around those two marks in ﬁgure 3 in the appendix.
As indicated by the local kernel regression ﬁtted onto the data, we observe substantial
diﬀerences right of the cut-oﬀ points.
Moreover, we show that the diﬀerences in mayor status also prevail in the entire sample.
Using the same estimation setup, we use the analysis to predict the mayor status (see table
4). If mayor status is independent of council size, the estimates should be insigniﬁcant from
zero. Our results indicate that there is a sizable and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the population
thresholds on the probability of choosing a full-time mayor.23
The above ﬁndings indicate that mayor status diﬀers signiﬁcantly between the observations
just to the left and just to the right of the thresholds. The important question is how that
aﬀects the estimates of the council size eﬀect. In table 5 we repeat the estimation including
a dummy for each observation that takes the value one when the municipality employs a
full-time mayor during that year. For comparison, we highlight the results from Egger and
21To rule out all automated changes in revenues / expenditures one would have to get detailed data on
very speciﬁc grants that are given from the state or federal level to the communities.
22As described above, there are two legal thresholds at 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants that prescribe con-
sequences for the major status. However, those rules are non-binding and only suggestions. We ﬁnd
that the probability of choosing a full-time mayor does not seem to be altered systematically at those
thresholds. Rather, the important changes are at thresholds below 5,000.
23We present the results within the 4 window sizes used by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010). A window
size of 15 implies that only municipalities within 15 percent of the population threshold are used in the
analysis.
13Table 4: The results of council size on predetermined mayor
status
Probability of having a full-time mayor
Window size 15 Percent 20 Percent 25 Percent 30 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.068*** 0.058** 0.051** 0.064***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019)
N 22611 29783 37177 44295
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. In this
regression, we estimate the eﬀect of council size on the mayor status deﬁned as
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the mayor is full-time employed.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust. Treatment is deﬁned by being right
to the population thresholds. All regressions include a third order polynomial in
population that is ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. In general, the setup is
similar to the regressions run by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010). Source: Own
calculations partly based on the program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010).
Koethenbuerger (2010) in panel 1 of 5. In the panels below we show the results controlling
for mayor status (panel 2) and additionally controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects (panel 3).
Including a control for mayor status, we ﬁnd that the point estimates reported in Egger and
Koethenbuerger (2010) drop signiﬁcantly and are no longer statistically signiﬁcant in the
preferred speciﬁcations. The speciﬁcation using a 15 percent window is shown to exhibit
no more eﬀects of the council size on governmental spending.24 If the mayor status is a
predetermined variable, this result would immediately suggest that the RDD is invalid.
However, as argued above, the timing is speciﬁc. The mayor status is determined after the
new council size is ﬁxed, yet before this new council takes oﬃce. One could argue that
it is in anticipation of the new council members that the old council decides to employ a
full-time mayor and that this in turn increased spending. This would mean to change the
interpretation of the eﬀect drastically. However, we believe that the choice of the mayor’s
status is in fact unrelated to the future council size. Under this assumption, results imply
that the RDD fails to identify the causal eﬀect of an increase in council size.
Interestingly, we observe a large estimate for the mayor status dummy, implying a 124
24In table 9 in the appendix, we show that this is also true for the eﬀect of council size on the disaggregate
spending categories (referring to table 5 in Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)). However, when we
include the mayor dummy in the analysis on revenue sources, we can not reject their estimates for the
local tax rates. In table (10) in the appendix, we show that the eﬀects on property taxes and trade
tax remain stable when we include the mayor dummy. As these categories are true choice variables
of the community, they might reﬂect a diﬀerent dynamic than the categories steered by choices of
responsibilities and grants from other tiers.
14Table 5: Main results - council size eﬀect with controlling for mayor
status
Log Total Expenditures
Window size 15 Percent 20 Percent 25 Percent 30 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1 : Replication of Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)
Treatment 0.109** 0.121*** 0.149*** 0.202***
(0.052) (0.045) (0.041) (0.037)
N 22631 29803 37197 44324
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel 2 : Controlling for mayor status
Treatment 0.024 0.049 0.087*** 0.124***
(0.040) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028)
Mayor status 1.240*** 1.233*** 1.227*** 1.217***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
N 22611 29783 37177 44295
R2 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41
Panel 3 : Controlling for mayor status and year eﬀects
Treatment -0.006 0.019 0.044 0.063***
(0.034) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024)
Mayor status 1.157*** 1.146*** 1.129*** 1.118***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
N 22404 29483 36766 43809
R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust. The dependent variable is the log of total expenditures. Panel 1
replicates the results in Egger and Koethenbueger (2010) (see their table 3). In Panel 2, we
control for the mayor status in the estimation by including a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the mayor is full-time employed. Panel 3, additionally also controls for year ﬁxed
eﬀects. In those last estimations we also excluded bigger communities that had the status
of a county free city. Treatment is deﬁned by being right to the population thresholds. All
regressions include a third order polynomial in population that is ﬂexible on both sides of
the threshold. Source: Own calculations partly based on the program provided by Egger
and Koethenbuerger (2010).
percent increase in total spending when the mayor is full-time. We do not intend to interpret
this to be a causal eﬀect. Rather, we believe that is it very likely that this estimate reﬂects
the importance of the complete choice set of the community at the time of elections. It
is precisely when the council decides to take over more responsibilities from other tiers
(like child care, water supply, etc.) that they also choose to have a full-time mayor that
administers the local administration.
154.3 Manipulation of the population numbers around the thresholds
We show above that simultaneous co-treatment as well as simultaneous endogenous choices
are posing a threat to the validity of the causal inference. As argued in the section on the
empirical methodology, the important identifying assumption is the argument that munic-
ipalities can not sort around the population thresholds (continuity assumption). This is of
speciﬁc concern here as the population ﬁgure is generally observable at all times and action
can be taken to manipulate the precise ﬁgures before the deadlines in question. Munici-
palities could act to manipulate the statistical numbers directly within the administration
or (more likely) they could start programs designed to attract new residents.25 Given that
the thresholds involve a multitude of consequences both for the political institutions and
the ﬁscal budgeting of the municipality, the concern of manipulation needs to be taken
seriously.
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) indicate the total number of observations just left (10914
obs) and just right (11690 obs) within the window of the limited sample.26 However, it is
standard praxis in applications of RDD to show a histogram of the frequencies just around
the thresholds. In ﬁgure 1, we present such a histogram for the data used throughout this
analysis (within the 15 percent window).
The graph indicates that the frequencies of observations just right and left of the thresholds
diﬀer systematically. There is a deﬁnite jump in the number of observations if one compares
the two groups just below the threshold (about 700 obs each) compared to the one group
just above (about 900 obs). The diﬀerence is further indicated by the gap in the local kernel
regression ﬁtted onto the data.27 In ﬁgure 4 in the appendix, we investigate the frequency
histogram for each of the thresholds individually. With the exception of the 2,000 threshold,
the frequency tend to be always higher just to the right of the threshold. Of considerable
diﬀerence are the jumps in the graphs for the 1,000, 3,000, 5,000 and 50,000 thresholds.28
This observation has direct consequences to the validity of the estimation design. If commu-
nities have the capability to manipulate their population ﬁgure at the margin, the continuity
25Municipalities could, for example, open new community areas for housing projects, guarantee kinder-
garten spots to newcomers or give direct ﬁnancial incentives to move to the town.
26Their results are presented in their table 3.
27We also ran ﬂexible polynomial regressions on the binned data to obtain standard errors on the observed
diﬀerence. As shown in the histogram, the data are quite variable between the bins. Nevertheless, the
jump is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level when we run linear and quadratic speciﬁcations
and at the 5 percent level using a third order polynomial that is ﬂexible on either side.
28We also tested diﬀerences of important predetermined variables such as total expenditures the year
before the election and mayor status during the last election period. However, we found no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences there, which implies that sorting is not along those dimensions.
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows the frequencies of observations in the analysis in grouped bins within the 15
% window (using 30 bins with a size of one percent each). The thresholds in the analysis have been
normalized to zero. Again, as in Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), the line ﬁtted onto the data is based
on a local kernel regression using Epanechnikov weights. A regression analysis using those bin averages
and a ﬂexible polynomial speciﬁcation in the log of population shows that the diﬀerence at the threshold is
both sizable and signiﬁcant at least at the 10 percent level (at 5 percent level when one uses a third order
polynomial speciﬁcation). Source: Own calculations partly based on the program provided by Egger and
Koethenbuerger (2010).
assumption for the RDD does not necessarily hold and the estimates are potentially biased
due to selection eﬀects. It might be the fast growing communities that seek to take on more
responsibilities which manage to end up just to the right of the thresholds.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we identify and discuss three main challenges requiring careful attention
when using population thresholds in regression discontinuity designs. First, the population
threshold may deﬁne changes in multiple rules and not only the treatment considered. Sec-
ond, when changes in population trigger the observed treatment it is likely that endogenous
17institutional choices occur simultaneously. Third, political entities may seek to manipulate
the oﬃcial number of inhabitants knowing that it aﬀects institutions at certain thresholds.
Revisiting Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), we ﬁnd evidence that our three concerns are
of practical relevance. (1) The population thresholds used by the authors not only trigger
changes in council size but also aﬀect many other budgetary and institutional rules. Bigger
communities have more responsibilities, receive more transfers and diﬀer in institutions. We
show that a large share of the spending increase at population thresholds relevant for the
seat count stems from increases in grants form higher government levels. (2) We observe
that when city councils grow in seats, the communities often decide endogenously to have
their mayor work full instead of part time. When we include the information on the status
of the mayor the spending eﬀects of additional seats found by Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010) become insigniﬁcant. (3) We ﬁnd evidence for manipulation of the population count,
again indicating that the reported estimates are likely to be invalid.
From our results we ﬁnd that it is crucially important to thoroughly verify the identifying
assumptions of the RDD when using population thresholds. Taking into account the com-
plexity of institutions and exogenous rules, notably at the local level, we recommend that
researchers carefully document the legislative setting throughout the period of observation.
In particular, they should discuss in detail whether population thresholds are used for other
institutions (including the applicable laws and thresholds) and what other endogenous de-
cisions might be taken simultaneously. The responsibility lies entirely on the researcher as
the precise institutional setting is hard to assess for any outsider and near to impossible
to judge from the pure data analysis. Further, the underlying continuity assumption needs
to be discussed with great detail and all available tests have to be carried out such as to
illustrate that the assumption is indeed supported by the data.
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Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the share of full-time mayors over the distribution of the population below
15000 inhabitants (there are no changes above). Each point represents the share within a bin (bandwidth
equals 100 inhabitants) including all municipalities of that size. The vertical lines illustrate where the
thresholds at with the council size changes are. Source: Own calculations.















































































−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Log population
Threshold: 3000
Notes: The ﬁgure investigates the share of full-time mayors just around the thresholds of 2000 and 3000
inhabitants. Similar to Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), we present the results within the 15 % window
(using 46 bins representing about 2/3 of one percent). The lines ﬁtted onto the data is based on a local
kernel regression using Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations partly based on the program
provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).
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Log population
100000
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the frequencies of observations at all thresholds below 200000 in grouped bins
within the 15 % window (using 30 bins with a size of one percent each). The line ﬁtted onto the data is
based on a local kernel regression using Epanechnikov weights. Source: Own calculations partly based on









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 8: Communal budgeting - shares of expen-
diture and revenues
Mean Share in %
Expenditures (Euro per capita)
Total 1909:5 100:0
on Personnel 369:6 19:4
on Materials 251:2 13:2
in Investment 368:3 19:3
Revenues (Euro per capita)
Total 1909:5 100:0
from Property Tax A 6:3 0:3
from Property Tax B 77:9 4:1
from Trade Tax 310:1 16:2
from General Grants 146:4 7:7
from Investment Grants 96:3 5:0
from Fees 178:6 9:4
Average debt (Euro per capita) 788:4
Notes: This table illustrates basic ﬁgures of an average munici-
pality budget. Column 2 presents the population weighted average
number of Euro per capita in each category over all 2056 municipal-
ities during the period of observation (1984-2004). Column 2 high-
lights the share that the individual item has on total expenditures
or revenues respectively. The categories named are not exclusive,
rather, we refer to all categories used in the analysis. Source: Own
calculations.
26Table 9: The results on expenditure categories controlling for
mayor status
Expenditure Categories (Window size 15 percent)
Invest Expend Material Expend Personnel Expend
(1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 : Replication of Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)
Treatment 0.103* 0.143** 0.169***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
N 22623 22626 22631
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001
Panel 2 : Controlling for mayor status and year eﬀects
Treatment -0.047 0.026 0.052
(0.048) (0.039) (0.038)
Mayor status 1.157*** 1.373*** 1.367***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
N 22396 22399 22404
R2 0.310 0.488 0.505
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust. The dependent variables are indicates above. Panel 1 replicates the
results in Egger and Koethenbueger (2010) (see their table 5). In Panel 2, we control for
the mayor status in the estimation by including a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the mayor is full-time employed. Additionally, we also controls for year ﬁxed eﬀects and we
excluded bigger communities that had the status of a county free city. Treatment is deﬁned
by being right to the population thresholds. All regressions include a third order polynomial
in population that is ﬂexible on both sides of the threshold. Source: Own calculations partly
based on the program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).
Table 10: The results on revenues controlling for mayor status
Revenues in Logs (Window size 15 percent)
Debt Prop Tax A Prop Tax B Trade Tax Gen. Grants Invest Grants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.031 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.009** 0.136* 0.106**
(0.060) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.077) (0.049)
N 21935 22404 22404 22404 21186 21314
R2 0.256 0.050 0.052 0.019 0.181 0.454
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The dependent variables are indicates above. In
this regression, we estimate the eﬀect of council size on the mayor status deﬁned as a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if the mayor is full-time employed. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. Treatment is deﬁned by being
right to the population thresholds. All regressions include a third order polynomial in population that is ﬂexible
on both sides of the threshold. In general, the setup is similar to the regressions run by Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010). Source: Own calculations partly based on the program provided by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010).
27